Collis Tahzib
I am an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. My research focuses on contemporary theories of liberalism. In particular, I am interested in the central principles of liberal political morality, such as the harm principle, the principle of state neutrality, and the public justification principle. My book on these themes, A Perfectionist Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press), has recently come out. I am Co-Editor (with Gabriel Uzquiano) of Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Before joining USC, I was a Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Merton College, Oxford University (2019-21). Prior to this, I read a DPhil in Philosophy at St John's College, Oxford University (2017-19), a BPhil in Philosophy at The Queen's College, Oxford University (2015-17), and an undergraduate degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Lincoln College, Oxford University (2012-15).
Email: tahzib@usc.edu
Book
A Perfectionist Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022)
Publications
1.."Pluralist Neutrality", Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2018), pp. 508-32.
2.."Perfectionism: Political not Metaphysical", Philosophy & Public Affairs 47 (2019), pp. 144-78.
3.."Perfectionist Duties", in D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne and S. Wall (eds), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 124-60.
4.."Does Social Trust Justify the Public Justification Principle?" Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (2021), pp. 461-78.
5.."Is Anti-Sectarianism a Desideratum of a Public Reason View?" Public Affairs Quarterly 35 (2021), pp. 228-46.
6.."Does Edificatory Perfectionism Express a Quidnunc Mentality?" in M. McBride and V. Kurki (eds), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 297-318.
7.."Do the Reactive Attitudes Justify Public Reason?" European Journal of Political Theory 21 (2022), pp. 423-44.
8.."Review of Samuel Freeman's Liberalism and Distributive Justice", Ethics 133 (2023), pp. 424-9.
9.."Are Public Reason Liberalism's Epistemological Commitments Indefensible?" The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2023), pp. 602-24.
10. "Separateness of Perspectives, Separateness of Persons, and Duties to the Self", Political Philosophy 1 (2024), pp. 128-55.
11. "A Perfectionist Theory of Justice: Replies to Billingham, Laborde and Quong", Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (forthcoming).
12. "A Perfectionist Theory of Justice: Replies to Sypnowich, Vallier and Wall", Social Theory and Practice (forthcoming).
13. "Rawls and Perfectionism", in C. Hartley, B. Neufeld and L. Watson (eds), Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of John Rawls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
14. "Whose Public Reason? Which Reasonableness?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming).
Selected Work in Progress
1. How to Think About the Harm Principle (and Other Mid-Level Normative Principles)
2. Are Rights Self-Other Symmetric?
3. Is Rawlsian Liberalism Radical Enough?