Collis Tahzib
I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. My research focuses on contemporary theories of liberalism. In particular, I am interested in the central principles of liberal political morality, such as the harm principle, the principle of state neutrality, and the public justification principle. My book on these themes, A Perfectionist Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press), has recently come out.
Before joining USC, I was a Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Merton College, Oxford University (2019-21). Prior to this, I read a DPhil in Philosophy at St John's College, Oxford University (2017-19), a BPhil in Philosophy at The Queen's College, Oxford University (2015-17), and an undergraduate degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Lincoln College, Oxford University (2012-15).
Email: tahzib@usc.edu
Book
A Perfectionist Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022)
Publications
1.."Pluralist Neutrality", Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2018), pp. 508-32.
2.."Perfectionism: Political not Metaphysical", Philosophy & Public Affairs 47 (2019), pp. 144-78.
3.."Perfectionist Duties", in D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne and S. Wall (eds), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. 124-60.
4.."Does Social Trust Justify the Public Justification Principle?" Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (2021), pp. 461-78.
5.."Is Anti-Sectarianism a Desideratum of a Public Reason View?" Public Affairs Quarterly 35 (2021), pp. 228-46.
6.."Does Edificatory Perfectionism Express a Quidnunc Mentality?" in M. McBride and V. Kurki (eds), Without Trimmings: The Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy of Matthew Kramer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), pp. 297-318.
7.."Do the Reactive Attitudes Justify Public Reason?" European Journal of Political Theory 21 (2022), pp. 423-44.
8.."Review of Samuel Freeman's Liberalism and Distributive Justice", Ethics 133 (2023), pp. 424-9.
9.."Are Public Reason Liberalism's Epistemological Commitments Indefensible?" The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2023), pp. 602-24.